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Most Americans are well aware that organizations like the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) have long sought to recruit the best and 
brightest from the hallowed halls of our most respected academic 
institutions.  The presence of such agencies on campuses has been a staple 
of higher education, except in instances where protests temporarily 
compelled universities to reject it, but the close relationship between those 
agencies and educational institutions has enjoyed a post-9/11 resurgence.  
The search for recruits, however, is benign in comparison to other 
activities being pursued on campuses.  Thus, fewer Americans are aware of 
the extensive presence of both foreign and domestic operatives who are 
covertly engaged in clandestine activities on those campuses.  It is 
precisely that sort of undisclosed activity that Pulitzer Prize winning 
journalist Daniel Golden seeks to bring to light in this work.  None of this 
will be startling news to anyone in the intelligence community, although 
the details of operations may certainly enhance professionals’ 
understanding of these kinds of activities.  For the student, novice, or the 
general public, the narrative is likely to be more revealing.  The ever 
increasing number of foreign students and foreign faculty members on 
American campuses makes the topic a compelling one to consider.  In 
addition to a significant increase in the number of foreign-born faculty 
members now working in STEM and other fields on U.S. campuses, 
Higher Education institutions in the U.S. have also come to rely 
increasingly on the enrollment of foreign students as a way to financially 
subsidize the schools.  Often, foreign students eagerly pay the full sticker 
price for tuition at prestigious schools, and as non-residents they pay more 
at public, taxpayer-supported institutions.  Some schools even add an 
additional fee for international students.    
  
Although most foreign students are merely seeking the best and most 
prestigious educational experience they can find, their presence in high 
numbers increases the possibility that at least some of them might be 
working for their nation’s intelligence services.  At the same time their 
presence opens an opportunity for U. S. Intelligence agencies to exploit 
those students for the agencies’ own purposes.  The same principle applies 
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to faculty members.  Thus, as Golden documents, both the counter-
intelligence and the positive intelligence missions are enjoying a robust 
run of activity on American campuses, often with the unwitting complicity 
of naive faculty members and administrators who either do not think in 
terms of potential intelligence threats, or in some cases choose to ignore 
them.  Although, as Golden suggests, such activities might contaminate the 
traditional ivory tower paradigm of academic freedom among a normally 
open and independent scholarly community, some institutions simply 
choose to ignore the potential for espionage that stems from globalized 
academic connections because it is to their economic advantage to do so. 
  
Golden’s objective in this book was to “explore how and why intelligence 
services were targeting American higher education, and what the 
implications were for national security and academic freedom” (xvi).  He 
divides his book into two distinct parts.  Part one looks at instances of 
espionage on campuses, and part two examines U.S. attempts to exploit 
foreign students and the academic environment in general.  Recognizing 
that both sides seek to milk the situation for all it’s worth, Golden goes on 
to rely on his journalistic skills to uncover information and utilize case 
studies of specific individuals to illustrate various instances of how 
exploitation is actually accomplished.  Many cases involve students or 
faculty members associated with the kinds of scientific and technology 
fields that deal with information that could provide some unique 
advantage to one side or another.  Golden raises a valid point in 
questioning whether clandestine activities that contribute to national 
security simultaneously damage academic collaboration by heightening 
suspicions among professors that potential collaborators might be 
functioning with ulterior motives on behalf of a third party.  Moreover, 
though his sample is a small one, Golden finds that recruiting our own 
professors as amateur spies seems not to yield very promising results.  
Whether from their reluctance or incompetence, Golden concludes that 
the lack of success has had a detrimental impact on academic culture and 
outweighs any small benefits that have been realized.  Perhaps more 
damaging is that some professors, like their institutions, sometimes fall 
victim to the ultimate weakness of an ivory tower outlook and thus ignore 
or fail to recognize the potentially nefarious motives of foreign 
counterparts in their field. 
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In terms of targeting foreign students, recruitment frequently relies on 
money as an incentive, and it is often a successful method for putting 
sources on the books, but the long-range prognosis for actually obtaining 
useful returns from those relationships is less certain.  As for the targeting 
of foreign professors, Golden notes that one intelligence agent suggested 
that academic conferences were a more fruitful venue than campuses.  The 
much publicized case of University of South Florida (USF) Professor Dajin 
Peng—whose story constitutes a significant segment of the book—
illustrates that the possibilities for recruiting foreign faculty members are 
many, but are not always profitable.  Peng’s personal indiscretions and 
allegations of mismanagement at his university set him up nicely for an 
FBI approach.  He was a tainted, but highly qualified candidate.  A 
graduate of China’s Institute of International Relations, Peng had 
extensive contacts in the Chinese intelligence community.  He later 
received his doctorate at Princeton and moved on to a position at USF, 
where he established Florida’s first Confucius Institute, whose branches 
are closely connected with the Chinese government.  Naturally such an 
institution was of much interest to the FBI, and when Peng fell afoul of 
USF in the wake of several accusations of malfeasance, an FBI agent came 
quickly to his support.  Though Peng preserved his job and tenured status 
at USF, he was punished with fines and suspensions, but without any 
criminal charges being lodged.  The cost for that leniency was working 
against China on behalf of the FBI and CIA.  The FBI efforts to salvage 
Peng’s career were misguided, however, and he was so reluctant to spy for 
the agency that he never really provided any useful information at all 
despite his many trips to China.  Later he even accused the FBI of 
orchestrating the charges against him in an effort to recruit him as a spy. 
  
In conclusion, Golden relates an interesting, though sometimes 
unnecessarily speculative tale that provides a sound introduction to the 
relationships between the intelligence community and academia.  Readers 
should take note, however, that it is a journalist’s tale told in journalistic 
fashion.  It is not the product of extensive scholarly research and it is 
based largely on news sources and other publically available materials 
supplemented by first-hand interviews.  The interview material elevates 
the book to a higher level, although the deficiencies in the overall quality of 
the research undermine the academic quality of the work and frequently 
compel readers to accept the validity of interviewees’ comments at face 
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value.  It is far from a fatal flaw though, as there is no reason to question 
the general thrust of the book or its conclusions despite those limitations. 
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